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COMMENTS
INCOMPETENCY AND INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL
AS A BASIS FOR RELIEF IN FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
by Ronald L. Palmer
Recently, increased attention directed to the constitutional rights
of the criminally accused has presented the courts with a large number of cases involving the incompetency of counsel. This has been
brought about primarily by the broadened availability of the federal
habeas corpus remedy to state prisoners' and by the current developments with respect to right to counsel.!
The case of Avery v. Alabama' serves as the connecting link

between the evolution of the right to assistance of counsel and the
requirement of competent or adequate counsel. Justice Black speaking
for the court indicated that the right to the assistance of counsel
means effective assistance of counsel. Incompetent or inadequate
counsel does not meet the "effective counsel" 4 or "due process"'
requirements.

This comment will consider cases, most of which have arisen
through habeas corpus applications,' concerned with the incompetency of counsel; i.e., the effect of counsel's voluntary omission or com'The Supreme Court's decision in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), redefining the
"exhaustion of state remedies" doctrine, broadened the availability of the federal habeas
corpus remedy to state prisoners. The court said that only state remedies presently available
need be exhausted before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, and that a prisoner need
not seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court before seeking relief by habeas corpus.
See Note, 18 Sw. L.J. 475 (1964).
'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), established a defendant's right to be
represented by counsel in state criminal proceedings even though not indicted for a capital
offense. Gideon has been extended to state misdemeanor proceedings. Harvey v. Mississippi,
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). See Williams, Federal Habeas Corpus and the State Courts,
36 Miss. L.J. 520 (1965); Comment, 19 Sw. L.J. 593

(1965); 19 Sw. L.J. 853 (1965).

3308 U.S. 444 (1940).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
6 The procedural aspect of these cases involves (1) an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal district court, (2) the denial of the application and (3) the subsequent
appeal of that decision. The applicable statutory provisions for habeas corpus applications are
28 U.S.C. 2241-55 (1948).

The purpose of a federal habeas corpus proceeding is to ascertain if the petitioner's detention violates the fundamental liberties safeguarded by the federal Constitution. Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963). Such a proceeding is not a substitute for an appeal, nor
are the courts functioning as "super-legislatures or glorified parole boards." United States
ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1948).
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mission of acts directly connected with the conduct of the trial. Secondary consideration will be accorded to a discussion of the type of
inadequacy which results from acts of counsel or a third party beyond counsel's control whose acts affect counsel's performance.7 It
should be borne in mind that the counsel being attacked by the petition is the original counsel who was unable to establish petitioner's
innocence. The courts are not oblivious of the attraction to the disappointed prisoner of putting to public test the competency of his
erstwhile defender.! They have recognized that the mind of the convicted defendant frequently fails to differentiate between incompetent counsel and unsuccessful counsel.! It has been stated that a common understanding among criminals is that any lawyer who cannot
"walk his man out" is incompetent." Justice Arnold, speaking in
Diggs v. Welch,"' states that the drafting of habeas corpus petitions
has become a game in many penal institutions and the convict's
period of enforced leisure allows him to use his ingenuity in attempting to try his former counsel. The courts recognize that many allegations of incompetency of counsel are frivolous and without merit,
and thus they are certain to treat the great volume of petitions which
make this allegation with some degree of dubiousness.
I.

THE STANDARD

BY WHICH INCOMPETENCY

OF COUNSEL IS JUDGED

The courts, speaking more or less in the abstract, have often stated
the necessary and desirable qualities of an attorney and the services
he must provide to satisfy adequately a defendant's constitutional
rights.
Perhaps the Seventh Circuit has stated the constitutional requirements of effective assistance of counsel most idealistically:
'The requirements of competency and adequacy of counsel will be discussed from the
viewpoint of the constitutional requirements of "assistance of counsel" and "due process."
This Comment is not intended to delineate the minimum standard of professional competence required of counsel by the various tribunals. Compliance with only such minimum
criteria would undoubtedly be morally unacceptable and against the scruples of the conscientious attorney. It is intended that this discussion will be of benefit and serve as a guide
to those who may be retained or court-appointed counsel for a defendant who is attacking
the competence of his former counsel on appeal or in a collateral proceeding.
The discussion will not encompass civil actions for negligence, incompetency or malpractice against an attorney, nor questions of disciplinary proceedings or disbarment for incompetency.
s United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 909 (1964); United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1963); Mitchell
v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); Jones
v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15-16 (D.C. Cit. 1945); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
'United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, supra note 8.
1"Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d at 792.
" 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:136

As to the requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment, the services
of counsel meet the requirements of the due process clause when he is a
member in good standing at the bar, gives his client his complete loyalty, serves him in good faith to the best of his ability, and his service is
of such character as to preserve the essential integrity of the proceedings as a trial in a court of justice."
The Fifth Circuit has stated its concept of "effective counsel" in
terms which might be characterized as a "reasonable counsel" standard: "We interpret the right to counsel as the right to effective counsel. We interpret counsel to mean not errorless counsel, and not
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.""3
The Tenth Circuit has made the following remarks on the desirable
traits of effective counsel:
We think the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplates
the guiding hand of an able and responsible lawyer, devoted solely to the
interest of his client; who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself
with the law and facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity to
present them to a court or jury in their most favorable light. 4
The actual standard of incompetency applied by the overwhelming majority of the federal courts is stated as follows: Incompetency
of counsel such as to be a denial of due process and effective representation by counsel must be such as to make the trial a farce, sham,
or mockery of justice." Although the application of this standard
may vary among courts, there is no doubt an extreme case must be
" United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cir.), petition for cert.
dismissed, 338 U.S. 809 (1949).
laMacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
14Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 848 (1948). See
also United States ex rel.Boucher v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1965); Hickock v.
Crouse, 334 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965).
" The following are representative recent cases listed by circuit approving and adopting
thistest.
United States ex rel.Machado v. Wilkins, 351 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1965); United
States ex rel. Boucher v, Reincke, supra note 14; United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke,
333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); United States v. Gonzalez, 321
F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); In re Ernst's Petition, 294 F.2d 556 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 917 (1961); James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1964); Snider v. Cunningham,
292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963); Snead v. Smyth, 273
F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959); Lotz v. Sacks, 292 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1961); O'Malley v.
United States, 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1957); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948); Mitchell v.
Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965); Audett v. United States, 265 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686 (9th
Cir. 1959); Application of Hodge, 262 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1958); Taylor v. United States,
238 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Latimer v. Cranor,
214 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1954); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Diggs v.
Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
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l
presented before any court would find incompetency of counsel."
Because of the duty imposed on the trial judge' and the prosecution 8 as officers of the state to intervene if it becomes apparent that
the trial is a mockery of justice due to counsel's incompetency, a determination of incompetency by a federal district or appellate court
is rare.
In applying the "mockery of justice" standard, the entire judicial
proceeding as a whole is considered and not just the particular acts
of defendant's attorney." Conceivably, a petitioner's attorney could
have been incompetent to some degree without the overall conduct
of the trial being reduced to a mockery of justice. The degree of incomptency by counsel required to reduce a trial to a mockery of
justice has been variously characterized as: that which amounts to
no representation at all,'" that which deprives the proceedings as a
whole of judicial character;" a total failure to present the defendant's cause in any fundamental respect;" a lack of skill so great
that in reality the defendant did not have a fair trial; a and an unawareness by counsel of a rule of law basic to the case which substantially weakens the defense."
A very small percentage of cases have actually found incompetency of counsel sufficient to have reduced the trial to a sham. The
following cases are illustrative of the extreme instances where such
incompetency has been found. The failure of counsel to request a
severance for a defendant indicted for larceny who was being tried
with an accomplice indicted for rape, and the agreement of counsel
to stipulate an inaccurate and coerced statement made by the defendant, has warranted a finding of such incompetency of counsel so as
to violate the petitioner's constitutional rights." Similarly, an attorney's failure to perfect an appeal because of ignorance of the correct

"6Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
v. Cranor, 214 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1954); United States ex rel.Darcy v.
Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953).
"In re Ernst's Petition, 294 F.2d 556 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 917 (1961);
Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
"Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 794 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 358 U.S. 850
(1958); United States ex rel.Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948); Diggs v.
Welch, supra note 18, at 670.
'4Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Feeley v.
Ragen, supra note 19.
" Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
"2Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
's Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 794 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850
(1958).
4
" Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965), quoting from the opinion by
Traynor, C. J. in People v. Ibarra, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963).
"Bowler v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 334 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1964).
'Latimer
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procedure, failure to challenge the sufficiency of an affidavit containing an error as to the crime with which defendant is charged,
failure to object to damaging hearsay and questionable instructions
by the court, and failure to save exceptions or request an instruction
on intoxication when considered together reduced the trial to a
mockery of justice." Where the defendant was charged with forgery, the failure of his counsel to object to a coerced confession, call
alibi witnesses, call a handwriting expert, or submit to the jury a
handwriting sample which had been requested, reduced the trial to
a sham." Advising a defendant to plead guilty knowing that his confession was coerced and failing to prepare or investigate the case has
been held to deprive an accused of the right to effective counsel."
Likewise the failure to take a procedural step (enter the correct
plea) which subsequently rendered the accused's defense a nullity
constitutes a mockery of justice." It is evident from the foregoing
illustrations, that the alleged incompetent acts must plainly prejudice the defendant and be of a gross nature and that in those cases
where incompetency was found, invariably the finding was based on a
combination rather than a single act or error by the attorney.
Several earlier cases allude to a rebuttable presumption of competence if the attorney is licensed to practice law before the particular
trial court." Also, a strong presumption of competency and regularity of judicial proceedings exists if there is no written transcript of
the trial proceedings available." In appropriate circumstances, judicial notice has been taken of an attorney's competence." Although
the more recent cases rarely mention a presumption of competency,
there is little doubt that such a presumption is tacitly recognized by
the courts.
The Fifth Circuit, which has a substantial volume of habeas corpus
proceedings, has not, until recently, adopted the "mockery of justice"
Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
28 Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851
(4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 832
(1963).
21 Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
"This is supported by the dictum in Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d at 855, where the
court says, "It does not necessarily follow that the same result would be reached in a case
in which only one, or even several, but less than all, of these factors are found to exist."
"United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948); Maye v. Pescor,
162 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1947); Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941). Cf. Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 874 (1945)
(holding that the presumption is non-rebuttable).
"Strong v. Huff, 148 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
"Wheatley v. United States, 198 F.2d 325, 327 (1oth Cir. 1952): "It may be concluded that his competency and qualifications as a lawyer before the court was a matter of
which the trial court had judicial knowledge and of which it could take judicial notice."
2

27
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standard.34 The prevalent standard applied in this circuit to incompetency of counsel allegations was the somewhat stricter test promulgated in MacKenna v. Ellis. " It was stated as follows: "effective

assistance of counsel means counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering effective assistance."' In at least one instance, the Fifth
Circuit in applying this standard found an attorney to be incompetent where it is doubtful that the application of the "mockery of
justice" rule would have led to the same result."
Although few courts have actually discussed the issue, many have
used language intimating that a dual standard of competency exists
for privately retained counsel and court-appointed counsel. This
inference arises from emphasis by the courts in many cases on the

fact that the defendant's counsel was of his own choosing."
This dichotomy in standard apparently had its roots in the older
"agency theory" which imputed any lack of skill or incompetency
of the attorney to the client who employed him. A client thus
became bound by the acts of his attorney unless he repudiated them
in open court."s With the advent of court-appointed counsel, the
" In the recent case of Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966), the Fifth Circuit did recognize and apply the "mockery of justice" rule.
" 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
361d. at 599; quoted with approval in Pineda v. Bailey, 340 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir.
1965). In Popeko v. United States, 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
835 (1963), the court considered the question of incompetency of counsel on appeal (rather
than in a collateral habeas corpus proceeding) and said that to show incompetency, a defendant must prove; (1) a deliberate purpose of the attorney to deprive him of a fair trial,
(2) that attorney's actions are so grossly negligent as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
" In MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877
(1961), the court applied the test to protect defendants from the possible errors of young,
inexperienced attorneys. At 601 the court makes the following comment:
As we see it, an essential element of a fair trial of a defendant with courtappointed counsel is trial court sensitivity to protecting the defendant against
hasty trials and against obvious mistakes of young, inexperienced, appointed
counsel. A genuflection in the direction of justice by the pro forma appointment of counsel . . . is something less than adequate judicial guidance and the
furnishing of effective counsel to accused.
3Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 866 (1965);
Popeko v. United States, 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963);
Lotz v. Sacks, 292 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1961); Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir.
1959); Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1958); Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1957); Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 409 (9th Cir, 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 938 (1957); Morton v. Welch, 162 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
779 (1947); Ex parle Haumesch, 82 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1936).
"g This theory is well illustrated by the following language used by the court in Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945):
The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does
not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiori will not be
grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
The concept of this rule is that the lack of skill and incompetency of the
attorney is imputed to the defendant who employed him, the acts of the attorney thus becoming those of the client and so recognized and accepted by
the court, unless the defendant repudiates them by making known to the court
at the time his objection. . . . A defendant cannot seemingly acquiesce in
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courts were naturally reluctant to hold a defendant bound by acts
of an attorney not of his own selection; thus the dual standard
arose.
Another theory, which has been advanced in a few cases as a basis
of charging a defendant with the acts of an attorney employed by
him, is based on the interpretation of the constitutional guarantee.
This theory draws a distinction between a lack of competent counsel
and a denial of the right to competent counsel, the latter being
construed as the extent of the constitutional guarantee."
There is also some mention in early cases of the existence of a
non-rebuttable presumption of competency of an attorney hired by
a defendant if the attorney is properly licensed to practice law.4'
In view of later cases stressing the right of a defendant to "effective
assistance of counsel," it is doubtful if this idea has any efficacy.
The Third Circuit, in deciding United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Handy,4' appeared to have buried the remnants of the dual standard
of competency which had long lurked in the background without
ever being either fully established or completely discredited. In
Darcy the court said, "nor should it be deemed to be a pertinent distinction that defendant's counsel is selected by himself or by members of his family or his friends rather than appointed by the court."4
Although this statement seems unequivocal, a later case in the Third
Circuit intimates that the question of the dual standard of competency is not conclusively settled."
The vast majority of federal habeas corpus cases involving an
allegation of incompetency of counsel, have made no reference to
or distinction between privately retained and court-appointed counhis attorney's defense of him or his lack of it and, after the trial has resulted
adversely to defendant, obtain a new trial because of the incompetency, negligence, fraud or unskillfulness of his attorney.
Cf. 40
Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965).
E.g., Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617
(1941). The court made the following statement:
There is a vast difference between lacking the effective assistance of competent
counsel and being denied the right to have the effective assistance of competent
counsel. It is the denial of the right to have such assistance that gives the right
to challenge a judgment of conviction by writ of habeas corpus.
Supra at 968.
This language was recently quoted and approved in Davis v. Bomar, 344 F.2d 84 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965).
41Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 874
(1945): "In my opinion, a defendant's representation by a licensed attorney of his own
choice satisfies the constitutional mandate and a trial judge has no authority to pass upon
the relative merits or capacities of licensed attorneys . . . even though the judge might think
the attorney entirely incompetent." Supra at 102.
42 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953).
43Id. at 417.
"In re Ernst's Petition, 294 F.2d 556, 558 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 917 (1961).
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sel. Inasmuch as the incompetency standard is based on the consti-

tutional guarantee of "right to effective counsel," there would not
seem to be any basis for a dual standard, and apparently the agency
theory is outdated.
II.

BASES

FOR ALLEGATIONS

OF INCOMPETENCY

OR

INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL

A. Mistakes, Errors Of Judgment, Trial Strategy
The federal courts in reviewing allegations of incompetency of
counsel have left no doubt that mistakes or errors of judgment,"
negligence," or even some degree of incompetency 7 by counsel does
not necessarily constitute a violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights. The court usually will not consider specific acts of counsel
separately, instead they view the proceeding as a whole to see if the
defendant's constitutional right to effective counsel has been violated. The refusal by the courts to consider in detail the constitutional aspects of each allegedly erroneous act is predicated upon the
recognition by the courts that few trials are totally free from mistakes by counsel.4
A frequent allegation of incompetency by a petitioner is based
on the failure of his trial counsel to object to a defect in an indictment. These types of defects are by their nature non-jurisdictional
and not violative of due process (or else they could be attacked
directly and not via an allegation of incompetency of counsel).
These defects are referred to by the courts as "minor defects."5 The
two principal cases which have discussed in detail the effect of the
failure of counsel to object to such defects have left little doubt as
to the hesitancy of the courts in inferring incompetency from such
acts." The courts, generally, list several factors which preclude any
inference of incompetency from the failure to object to an indictment defect; a failure by petitioner to show actual harm as a result
'E.g., Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1959); Edwards v. United States,
256 F.2d 707, 708 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958); United States ex rel.
Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948).
46 United States ex rel.
Hamby v. Ragen, 178 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 905 (1950); Norman v. United States, 100 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 660 (1939).
" United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
46Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847
(1958); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
'E.g., Diggs v. Welch, supra note 48.
0
" Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959). If the defect affects a court's jurisdiction or is violative of due process in itself, the question of incompetency of counsel is
moot.
1Snead v. Smyth, supra note 50; Bostic v. Rives, 107 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1940).
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of the defect,52 a showing that a successful objection to the defect
would only gain a time delay,53 a showing that the petitioner actually
had knowledge of facts omitted in the indictment," a failure by the
petitioner to request a bill of particulars, " and a failure by petitioner
to raise the issue of the defect prior to the habeas corpus proceeding. 6
From the language used by the courts, it is evident that a finding of
one or any combination of these factors would negate any possible
inference of incompetency of counsel. Since a case will rarely arise
where one or more of these factors are not present, it can be stated
almost unequivocally that the failure of counsel to object to a minor
defect in an indictment is not a valid basis for an attack on the competency of trial counsel.
One of the most common and unfruitful allegations of incompetency of counsel is that of bad trial strategy. The courts are most
emphatic in refusing to consider any action which may be characterized as trial strategy as an indication of incompetency." If any reason,
regardless of how remote, can be propounded to justify the attorney's
course of conduct, the courts will characterize such action as trial
strategy.
The failure of counsel to urge a defendant's insanity as a defense
to the crime with which he is charged is characterized by the courts
as trial strategy."8 Thus, no inference of incompetency can be drawn
from it. This is true even if the evidence of insanity, if it had been
offered, would have been sufficient to warrant submission of the
issue to the jury."0
The decision whether a defendant should or should not testify in his
own behalf is often attacked by petitioners for writ of habeas corpus
as showing evidence of incompetency. The courts have held this to be
an obvious exercise of judgment and trial strategy by an attorney
and not a basis for any inference of incompetency." Only if an
"Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1959); Bostic v. Rives, supra note 51,
at 651.
" Bostic v. Rives, 107 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664
(1940).
54 See note 52 supra.
5 Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959).
s Ibid.
"7See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex 'tel. Machado
v. Wilkins, 351 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1965); Burkett v. Mayo, 173 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 933 (1949). Cf. United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.
1963).
58James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1964); Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683
(4th Cir. 1961).
" Snider v. Cunningham, supra note 58. But cf. Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664
(6th Cir. 1965).
" Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 809 (1963).
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attorney refused to allow a defendant to testify in his own behalf
against the defendant's express wishes and without his acquiescence
would the court consider such evidence in determining if the petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated.61 Similarly, the
courts have characterized counsel's failure to subpoena or call certain
witnesses as an exercise of judgment and trial strategy and not a
basis for an allegation of incompetency."
The failure of counsel to seek an appeal is often assailed by petitioners as showing incompetent representation. The courts properly
realize that the decision, as to whether a particular case should be
appealed, is one properly within the province of the counsel's discretion. 3
Another important exercise of judgment by counsel which is
often attacked is counsel's advice to a defendant to enter a plea of
guilty. The petitioner typically recites that counsel used coercion,
undue influence, or intimidation to persuade him to plead guilty."4
The courts uniformly hold that counsel's urging a defendant to enter
a guilty plea does not show incompetent representation." This includes a threat by counsel to withdraw from the case unless such plea
is entered."
Occasionally the courts will consider the intelligence and education of a particular defendant in determining if he was qualified to
use his judgment in planning his defense strategy. A defendant who
imposes his strategy on defense counsel and who is familiar with the
legal issues involved cannot later complain because counsel followed
his desires."' However, a court will not impute a lack of skill or
negligence by counsel to a defendant who is ignorant of his rights
and not familiar with criminal proceedings,4 ' and counsel may in
good faith disregard a defendant's express instructions concerning
trial strategy under such circumstances.' On the other hand, the
Ibid.
O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); Flourre v. United States,
217 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1954).
6McCoy v. Bomar, 333 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1964); Riddle v. McLeod, 240 F.2d 206
61

62

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
" Davis v. Bomar, 344 F.2d 84
tion of Hodge, 262 F.2d 778 (9th
Cir. 1947); Crum v. Hunter, 151

967
(6th
Cir.
F.2d

(1957).
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); Applica1958); Shepherd v. Hunter, 163 F.2d 872 (10th
359 (loth Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 850

(1946); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
Cf. Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
" See cases cited note 64 supra.

66 Davis v. Bomar, 344 F.2d 84 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965).
67 United States ex rel. Boucher v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1965).
66Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869
(1945). See also Bowler v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 334 F.2d 202, 205-06 (4th
Cir. 1964).
"'Pierce v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1942) (counsel refused to challenge a
juror or recall a witness contrary to defendant's instructions).
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courts usually will not consider an attorney's lack of experience as
an indication that he does not possess the judgment and skill required to conduct an accused's defense.7"

B. Insufficient Preparation
Insufficient preparation may result from the neglect of a defendant's attorney or because defendant's attorney was not given sufficient notice to enable him to adequately prepare. There is no doubt
today that the mere appointment of counsel by the court with no
further participation by that counsel is a denial of effective assistance of counsel."1 Likewise a perfunctory appearance by counsel
without any study or preparation does not meet the constitutional
requirements."2 Thus, the courts realize that adequate time for preparation is a basic factor in providing effective assistance of counsel. 3
The problem is what constitutes adequate time for preparation?74
The general rule followed by the federal courts is to consider the
complexity of each individual case, both in reference to the facts and
the law involved, and on this basis determine if counsel had adequate time to prepare." This concept apparently evolved from Justice
Black's statement in Avery v. Alabama, " "that the examination and
preparation of the case, in the time permitted by the trial judge, had
been adequate for counsel to exhaust its every angle is illuminated
"°Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847
(1958); United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947). But see MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
" MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
The court made the following observations: "A genuflection in the direction of justice by
the pro forma appointment of counsel . . . is something less than adequate judicial guidance
and the furnishing of effective counsel to accused." Supra at 600.
7
Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962).
' Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 360
U.S. 472 (1959):
A showing that the time allowed for consultation was brief and that the facilities made available for such consultation were unsatisfactory lends color to
a charge that legal representation was inadequate. No matter how capable and
zealous an attorney may be, unreasonable curtailment of time or lack of
proper facilities may prevent the attorney from affording adequate legal representation.
Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721, 723 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 848 (1948): "We
think the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplates the guiding hand of an
able and responsible lawyer . . . who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the
law and facts of the case ... "
74 "Preparation" has been defined as familiarization with prior court proceedings and the
current status of the case, Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851, 855 (4th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963), and knowledge of the facts and law upon which the defendant was advised, United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 950 (1950).
5
" Underwood v. Bomar, 335 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 921
(1965); United States ex eel. Tillery v. Cavell, 294 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 945 (1962); United States v. Wight, supra note 74.
76308 U.S. 444 (1940).

1966]

COMMENTS

by the absence of any indication.., that they could have done more
had additional time been granted."" This examination of the facts
in each individual case leads to a wide variance in the actual length
of time found to be adequate for preparation. The appointment of
m six
counsel two days before the trial, s the same day as the trial,"
s
hours before the trial,"' and fifteen minutes before the trial ' have
been upheld as allowing adequate time for preparation. Appointment
of counsel ten minutes8' and one minute" before the trial has been
held to be inadequate time for preparation. Thus, there is no standard
to be applied; the situations must be analyzed on a case-by-case
basis.
C. Conflict Of Interest
One of the more stringent requirements of effective counsel which
the courts have evolved concerns the possible conflict of interest of
an attorney in conducting an accused's defense. This is generally
spoken of by the court's in terms of "inadequate counsel" rather
than "incompetent counsel" as the actual conduct of the trial is not
usually considered. If a substantial conflict of interest is shown, the
courts tend to find "inadequate representation" even though the
attorney's performance may not reflect any incompetency.
The most common conflict of interest problem arises when one
attorney represents both the defendent being tried and a witness who

is called to testify at the trial. This is often the result of one attorney
being appointed to represent several defendants charged with the
same crime. Where such conflict has arisen, the continued representation of both interests without a full disclosure to and approval by
both parties has been held to be a denial of effective counsel." Similarly, if a witness at the defendant's trial is a regular client of the
attorney, then there may be sufficient conflict of interest to deny the
defendant effective counsel."5
The appointment of an attorney who had a job application filed
77id.

at 452. Cf. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).

"Underwood

v. Bomar, 335 F.2d 783

(6th Cit. 1964),

cert. denied, 380 U.S. 921

(1965).

71 United States ex rel. Tillery v. Cavell, 294 F.2d 12 (3d Cit. 1961),

cert. denied, 370

U.S. 945 (1962).

8"Baldwin v. United States, 260 F.2d 117 (4th Cit. 1958),

cert. denied, 360 U.S. 938

(1959).

"1United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376

(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950

(1950).
8Martin v. Virginia, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cit. 1965).
'4 United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947).
1 Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461,
463-64 (5th Cir. 1962); Hayman v. United
States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950), vacated and remanded, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
"Tucker v. United States, 235 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956).
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with the district attorney's office has been held to be a denial of
effective counsel because of the possible conflict of interest."s In
cases where the defendant's attorney has held a part time job as
United States Commissioner, s7 or as city attorney, ss however, no
conflict of interest has been found as long as the particular case did
not involve the attorney in his official capacity.
The fact that an attorney is under indictment for solicitation of
business,8 9 or that the defendant has filed a grievance with a bar
committee against the attorney representing him," is not a sufficient
conflict of interest to be considered a denial of effective assistance
of counsel. A contention that an attorney representing an unpopular
cause has a conflict of interest due to the possible prejudice of the
local community, which includes his clientele, has also been rejected.8 '
D. Unethical Conduct
In the bizarre case of Bovey v. Grandsinger," the court was concerned with the effect of flagrant unethical conduct by defendant's
attorney on defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. During a recess in the defendant's trial, his attorney attempted to enlarge a bullet hole in a leather belt offered in evidence by the prosecution to allow defendant's attorney to argue that the victim was

slain by a gun of a larger calibre than that which the defendant
possessed. This attempt to alter the exhibit was discovered and the
actions of the attorney were recorded and admitted within hearing of
the jury. The court held that undoubtedly the attorney's acts deprived the petitioner of effective assistance of counsel.8
Although perhaps not accurately characterized as unethical conduct, there has been some discussion as to whether, as a matter of
law, an attorney who is delinquent in his bar dues is adequate counsel. Formerly, delinquency in paying bar dues was held to prevent
counsel from adequately representing a defendant." This view has
been overruled on the basis that the right to counsel of one's choice
8 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
The court says, "We consider undivided loyalty of appointed counsel to client as essential
to due process." Supra at 599.
"Audett v. United States, 265 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
"8Harris v. Thomas, 341 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1965).
88United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1963).
"'Swope v. McDonald, 173 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 960 (1949).
81Hickock v. Crouse, 334 F.2d 95, 99 (loth Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982
(1965).
12253 F.2d 917 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 929 (1958).
83Cf. Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (a reprimand to counsel
for arriving late and for keeping his hands in his pockets and leaning on the table during
of a witness did not show inadequacy of counsel).
examination
4
S MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
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is a very personal right and cannot be denied because the counsel
chosen is delinquent in his bar dues."

E. Mental Condition
Several cases have considered the allegation by a petitioner that
his trial counsel was insane or mentally ill at the time of trial thus
denying him effective assistance of counsel." This allegation is usually
based on the discovery by the petitioner of a prior or subsequent
mental disorder suffered by his counsel." The courts have unanimously refused to find a denial of effective assistance of counsel
based on such an allegation. The reasoning adopted by the courts
is that if the trial judge did not notice any irrational behavior by
counsel and if the trial did not constitute a "mockery of justice"
then the petitioner's constitutional rights have not been violated.
III. CONCLUSION

As a result of the expanding emphasis being accorded the right
to be represented by counsel, the standard which court-appointed
counsel must meet will probably be stricter. The courts realize that
representation by an incompetent attorney may be as harmful to a
defendant as no representation at all."'
In accordance with the trend to raise the standard of competency
required to meet the constitutional right of effective assistance of
counsel, the courts in the future may consider factors heretofore
thought to be irrelevant. If the question is close concerning counsel's
competency, the courts may well consider the attorney's previous
related experience. Similarly, in a close case the courts may consider
the age and experience of the attorney involved."' This discussion
should sound a warning to those practitioners who are newly admitted to the bar or who have had limited exposure to criminal trial
practice. To protect their reputations, these members of the bar
should be especially thorough in their preparation of court-appointed
cases.
Although the trend is toward raising the standard of competency
required of counsel to be considered "effective assistance of counsel,"
it is doubtful if the courts will depart from the "mockery of justice"
"sWhite v. Beto, 322 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 925 (1964).
"United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 909 (1964); Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 874 (1945); Pierce v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 337 (10th Cit. 1942); Hagan v. United
States, 9 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1925).
97 Pierce v. Hudspeth, supra note 96; Hagan v. United States, supra note 96.
s See text accompanying note 20 supra.
" MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
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rule. The rule is flexible and general enough to allow the courts to
consider all the factors of any individual case and use their discretion. Thus the courts can actually quote the "mockery of justice"
rule but raise the standard by finding certain acts now constitute a
trial a mockery of justice where previously they would not have been
so considered.
In the final analysis, the "mockery of justice" rule leaves the
determination of incompetency to the federal district courts. This is
very desirable as few are better qualified to determine the competency of counsel than a judge who observes counsel at work as a part
of his daily routine.

